Research

Among the existing accounts of the relationship between Newton’s bodies and laws, two are especially compelling: the “law-constitutive” approach from Katherine Brading and the “formal-cause” approach from Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser. Both accounts argue that Newton’s bodies are (at least partially) metaphysically dependent on his laws. In this article, I reply to Brading, Biener, and Schliesser. I develop negative arguments against their approaches by closely examining three features of Newton’s ontology—forms, particles, and active principles—and their relationship to the laws. I also offer an explanation as to why “law-first” approaches have (understandably) dominated recent Newtonian exegesis. Finally, I present a positive argument for what I believe to be a superior alternative: Newton’s law-first approach is purely pragmatic. It is a feature of his experimental philosophy that we should begin our inquiry into the metaphysical constituents of the universe with the laws that arise from them. This does not entail, however, that Newton views laws as constituting or forming physical bodies. Newton’s metaphysics should be interpreted as “matter-first,” with bodies giving rise to laws, whereas his epistemology should be interpreted as “law-first,” with knowledge of laws giving rise to knowledge of bodies.

Arguments for an extended evolutionary synthesis often center on the concept of “reciprocal causation.” Proponents argue that reciprocal causation is superior to standard models of evolutionary causation for at least two reasons. First, it leads to better scientific models with more predictive power. Second, it more accurately represents the causal structure of the biological world. Simply put, proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis argue that reciprocal causation is empirically and explanatorily apt relative to competing causal frameworks. In this paper, I present quantitative survey data from faculty members in biology departments at universities across the United States to evaluate this claim. The survey data indicate that a majority of the participants do not agree (i.e., most either disagree or neither agree nor disagree) that the concept of reciprocal causation confers a larger advantage on research practices. However, a majority of the participants agree that the causal framework of the extended evolutionary synthesis more accurately represents the structure of the biological world. These results demonstrate that the explanatory merits of a conceptual framework and its practical utility can come apart in interesting and informative ways.

Marc Ereshefsky’s project of eliminative pluralism holds that, as there is no unifying feature among all species concepts, we ought to doubt the existence of the species category. Here, I argue that one promising strategy for saving the species category is to reframe it as a natural kind after the practice turn. I suggest situating the species category within a recent account of natural kinds proposed by Marc Ereshefsky and Thomas Reydon called “scientific kinds”. Scientific kinds highlight ontological boundaries. More importantly, they recognize boundaries drawn from the lab and the field, not only from the armchair. The point of this exercise is to situate the species category within an account of natural kinds that is sensitive to scientific practice. In order to argue for a realist interpretation of the species category, and not merely a pragmatic one, I rely on an approach to scientific metaphysics from Ken Waters that shifts the attention from “theory focused” to “practice-centered” analysis.

Genetic Assimilation and Accommodation: Models and Mechanisms

with Fred Nijhout and Anna Kudla

Genetic assimilation and genetic accommodation are mechanisms by which novel phenotypes are produced and become established in a population. Novel characters may be fixed and canalized so they are insensitive to environmental variation, or can be plastic and adaptively responsive to environmental variation. In this review we explore the various theories that have been proposed to explain the developmental origin and evolution of novel phenotypes and the mechanisms by which canalization and phenotypic plasticity evolve. These theories and models range from conceptual to mathematical and have taken different views of how genes and environment contribute to the development and evolution of the properties of phenotypes. We will argue that a deeper and more nuanced understanding of genetic accommodation requires a recognition that phenotypes are not static entities but are dynamic system properties with no fixed deterministic relationship between genotype and phenotype. We suggest a mechanistic systems-view of development that allows one to incorporate both genes and environment in a common model, and that enables both quantitative analysis and visualization of the evolution of canalization and phenotypic plasticity.

Genetic Consequences of Biologically Altered Environments

with Michelle D’Aguillo, Brandie Quarles, and Kathleen Donohue

Evolvable traits of organisms can alter the environment those organisms experience. While it is well appreciated that those modified environments can influence natural selection to which organisms are exposed, they can also influence the expression of genetic variances and covariances of traits under selection. When genetic variance and covariance change in response to changes in the evolving, modified environment, rates and outcomes of evolution also change. Here we discuss the basic mechanisms whereby organisms modify their environments, review how those modified environments have been shown to alter genetic variance and covariance, and discuss potential evolutionary consequences of such dynamics. With these dynamics, responses to selection can be more rapid and sustained, leading to more extreme phenotypes, or they can be slower and truncated, leading to more conserved phenotypes. Patterns of correlated selection can also change, leading to greater or less evolutionary independence of traits, or even causing convergence or divergence of traits, even when selection on them is consistent across environments….

In this paper, I argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’, to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept.